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Abstract—In 5G, identity privacy of a user is proposed to
be protected by concealing the identiﬁer of the user. In order
to route the concealed identiﬁer to the appropriate destination,
certain information about the international mobile subscriber
identity (IMSI) – country code and network code, need to be
revealed. But, as was recently pointed out, the routing of requests
for authentication information between visited and home network
and also within the home network, needs more information about
the IMSI to be revealed. It was also recently pointed out that
there are restrictions on user identity privacy due to lawful
interception in the serving network. In this new context, we re-
examine published alternative solutions of identity privacy. We
ﬁnd the previously promising solutions e.g., solution based on
public key of home network become less promising. We ﬁnd
the solution based on identity based encryption becomes more
promising than it was before.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a mobile computing environment, the privacy of a
user’s current physical location is desirable [16], [31]. This
is because lack of the location privacy enables third parties
to track a user. To achieve location privacy, we need the
privacy of the users’ identities. In the 3GPP-deﬁned mobile
networks, a user has many identities, e.g., international mobile
subscriber identity (IMSI), international mobile equipment
identity (IMEI), mobile station international subscriber direc-
tory number (MSISDN), and many more. Privacy of all of
these identities need to be protected. Among these identities,
IMSI is the most difﬁcult to protect. This is because IMSI
is used for the identiﬁcation of a user that is unknown (e.g.,
when connecting for the ﬁrst time) to the serving network
[3], hence that IMSI lacks conﬁdentiality protection. Serious
effort has been put to solve this problem by the academic and
3GPP community. However, IMSI privacy is still not achieved,
the so-called IMSI catchers are still in existence [18], [17],
[25] and have become very cheap (in the order of hundreds of
Euros) off-the-shelf [30], [27] technology. The alarming news
is that the IMSI catchers are no more only an idle threat but
have become a reality to the extent of mass surveillance [28].
Identity privacy is a major requirement in 5G [8]. Many
solutions have been proposed to defeat IMSI catchers [6].
Most of the solutions are based on cryptographic techniques.
Comparative analysis between the competitive solutions have
been published [23]. There are pros and cons in every solu-
tion. 3GPP community is now at the verge of ﬁnalizing the
speciﬁcation for the ﬁrst phase of 5G technology. A solution
based on public key cryptography has been chosen to protect
the privacy of IMSI [8] (in Section 6.12.2). In this solution,
the home network (HN) owns the public-private key pair. The
user equipment (UE) shall generate a concealed identity with
the raw public key that was securely provisioned to the user
by the HN. We call this solution as root-key based solution.
An issue about routing authentication information has
surfaced recently [11]. We will explain this issue in Section IV.
To solve this issue, the root-key based solution needs to reveal
more information about the identity of a user. This reduces
the effectiveness of root-key based solution. Another issue
related to lawful interception (LI) has been noticed recently
[11]. We will explain the issue in Section V. In Section III, we
categorize the promising solutions based on the cryptographic
techniques used. In Section VI, we will present a comparative
analysis of the alternative categories of solutions in the light
of these two new concerns as well as the relevant concerns
from [23], [22]. We will see that the balance of pros and cons
between different solutions changes signiﬁcantly. The root-
key based solution which appeared to be quite straightforward
and effective solution [23] becomes less effective and requires
more implementation effort. On the other hand, a solution
based on identity based encryption (IBE) [23], [22] which
had its own cons, solves both of the concerns of IMSI-based
routing and LI. In this light we will argue that solution based
on identity based encryption could be the most effective and
also fairly straightforward solution to protect the privacy of
IMSI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we present an abstract view of a mobile
network, and then discuss how IMSI is used, and how privacy
of IMSI is vulnerable in the legacy networks. We will also
outline the principles of different categories of solutions.
1) IMSI: A unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI) shall be allocated to each mobile subscriber in the
GSM/UMTS/EPS system [2]. An IMSI is usually presented
as a 15 digit number but can be shorter. The ﬁrst 3 digits
are the mobile country code (MCC), which are followed
by the mobile network code (MNC), either 2 or 3 digits.
The length of the MNC depends on the value of the MCC.
The remaining digits are the mobile subscription identiﬁcation
number (MSIN) within the network’s customer base [2].
In the legacy networks – e.g., LTE, when a user equipment
(UE) tries to connect to a network for the ﬁrst time, the UE has
to identify itself using IMSI [3]. Once the UE is identiﬁed, an
authentication protocol (e.g., EPS AKA [3]) is run in between
the UE and the network. If the authentication protocol runs
successfully, the network serves the UE with the services the
UE is authorized to avail.
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2) Mobile Network: A mobile network consists of UE,
serving network (SN) and HN. Both of the SN and HN consist
of radio access network (RAN) and core network (CN). The
RAN of SN provides the connectivity in between UE and CN
of SN. On the other hand, the CN of SN connects itself with
the CN of HN via IPX. Note that in a non-roaming situation,
the SN and HN are the same network. See Figure 1.
3) IMSI Catchers: There are two more entities which are
not part of the network but relevant in our discussion, because
they attack the network. They are passive IMSI catchers and
active IMSI catchers [22]. The interface UE-SN is a logical
interface in between UE and SN. This interface is initially
unprotected. The logical interface SN-HN between SN and
HN is protected and the security of this interface is out of
the scope of this paper. The passive IMSI catchers eavesdrop
on the UE-RAN interface when it is unprotected to extract an
IMSI. The active IMSI catchers impersonate a legitimate SN
and run a legitimate-looking protocol with the UE in order to
ﬁnd out the IMSI. The HN and UE both know the IMSI and
they are trusted. Both passive IMSI catchers and active IMSI
catchers are untrusted.
4) Solutions Against IMSI catchers: In legacy networks,
the approach of protecting IMSI privacy is to use a temporary
identiﬁer instead of the actual IMSI and keep changing the
temporary identiﬁer at a feasible frequency. Note that the
temporary identiﬁer has to be assigned over a conﬁdentiality
protected channel and different entities of the network may
assign different temporary identiﬁers to the UE. In the LTE
network, the temporary identiﬁer assigned by serving network
(SN) is called globally unique temporary identity (GUTI) [2]
and the home network (HN) does not assign any temporary
identiﬁer to the UE. However, during the initial attachment of
a UE to the SN, the UE has neither a GUTI nor a security
context with the SN that can assign it with a GUTI. Besides,
GUTI can be lost by either one or both of the UE and the
SN. This would force the UE to reveal its IMSI to the SN
to keep itself from permanently locked out of the network.
This problem gives an opportunity to an active IMSI catcher
who impersonates a legitimate SN and forces the UE to run
the initial attachment protocol. This also gives an opportunity
to a passive IMSI catcher to eavesdrop the IMSI sent in clear
text. To ﬁght against these active IMSI catchers in 5G, different
solutions [19], [26], [29], [24], [21], [20], [23], [22] have been
proposed.
III. CATEGORIES OF SOLUTIONS
All the countermeasures against IMSI cathers that we are
aware of are based on cryptographic encryption techniques. In
this section we will look into different categories of solutions.
The categories are based on different cryptographic encryption
techniques.
1) Pseudonym Based: The pseudonym based solutions as
proposed in [26], [19], [29], [24], [20] fall in the category of
symmetric key encryption. In this kind of solutions, temporary
identiﬁers called pseudonyms are assigned to a UE. Next
time when the UE tries to identify itself to an SN, it uses
a pseudonym instead of IMSI. Periodically, whenever there is
an opportunity, the HN sends a new pseudonym to the UE
with conﬁdentiality and integrity protection using a symmetric
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Fig. 1. High-level Security Architecture
key – that is why it falls under the category of symmetric key
encryption. One such opportunity is when the HN sends the
authentication vector to an SN.
2) Certiﬁcate based: In the certiﬁcate based encryption,
the public key is signed by a trusted third party. The sender
has to be pre-provisioned with the root certiﬁcate so that the
sender can authenticate the public key of the receiver. Use
of certiﬁcate based public-key encryption to conceal long-
term identity has been suggested in 3GPP TR 33.821 [1]. The
UE encrypts the IMSI using the public key of the SN before
sending. To use certiﬁcate based public-key cryptography, we
need to ﬁgure out who are the root certiﬁcate authorities (CA)
and who else can be a CA, who owns a public key, how
a certiﬁcate can be revoked, and how the UE can be re-
provisioned with a new root certiﬁcate if needed. Different
solutions can be devised based on the choice of root CAs and
other CAs.
3) Root-key Based: In the root-key based encryption, no
runtime authentication of the public key is required, because a
very limited number of public keys are used in the system and
all the senders are pre-provisioned with all the existing public
keys. Use of root-key has been proposed in 3GPP TR 33.899 in
solution #7.3. In this approach only one pair of public-private
key pair exists. This key pair is owned by the HN and we call
it the root-key. The HN provisions the public key to all its
UEs. Instead of sending the IMSI, the UE encrypts the IMSI
with the public root key and sends the result to the SN along
with MCC and MNC. The SN sends the encrypted IMSI to
the HN. The HN decrypts the IMSI and sends the IMSI back
to the SN along with an authentication vector (AV).
4) Identity Based: In IBE, the public key of a receiver is
computed from the identity of the receiver and the public key
of a trusted third party known as private key generator (PKG).
The public key of the trusted third party has to be provisioned
to the sender. The private key of the receiver is computed as a
function of the identity of the receiver and the private key of
the PKG. The private key of the receiver has to be provisioned
to the receiver by the PKG. In IBE based solution [22], [23],
the HN is the PKG. The HN has a public-private key pair.
The UEs are provisioned with the public key of the HN. The
SNs which have a roaming agreements with the HN are also
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provisioned with their respective private keys by the HN. When
a UE identiﬁes itself with IMSI, it encrypts the IMSI using the
public key of the SN. The UE computes the public key of the
SN as function of the identity of the SN and the public key
of the HN. The most interesting aspect of this solution is that
there is no certiﬁcate involved and the SN can decrypt the
encrypted IMSI.
All these solutions try to defeat the IMSI catchers by
concealing the permanent identity – IMSI. The concealed
identity in 5G system is known as subscription concealed
identiﬁer (SUCI) and the permanent identity in 5G system,
which corresponds to IMSI in earlier generations of the cellular
networks, is known as subscription permanent identiﬁer (SUPI)
[8]. In the next two sections we will explain the issues around
IMSI-based routing and LI that impacts the effectiveness of
different categories of solutions.
IV. IMSI-BASED ROUTING
First aspect of this issue is the routing of authentication
information requests inside one mobile network. Subscribers’
database of the mobile network operator is typically divided
into several parts to increase lookup efﬁciency. In today’s
cellular systems, serving network’s request for authentication
information is routed to the correct database partition based
on typically the ﬁrst one to three digits of the MSIN [4].
Subscribers’ database in 5G system is called Uniﬁed Data
Management (UDM), and similarly to the previous generations
of cellular systems, there are likely to be several UDM entities
in the mobile network (in order to increase lookup efﬁciency).
If the MSIN in the authentication information request
message is encrypted, then either, (i) MSIN has to be decrypted
before routing, or (ii) the routing of the message to the correct
UDM is based on another part in the message. The second
of these options is more attractive than the ﬁrst, because the
decryption entity may become a new bottleneck in the 5G
system. Therefore, 3GPP SA3, the security group of 3GPP,
is moving towards option (ii). (One solution proposed in
3GPP SA3 uses home network’s public key identiﬁer for
routing purposes; another solution proposes leave required
SUCI routing information unencrypted as part of the SUCI
[5].)
Another aspect of this issue is the routing of authentica-
tion information requests between different mobile networks.
Mobile network operators interconnect their networks via IP
exchanges (IPXs). Typically MCC and MNC are sufﬁcient for
routing visited network’s requests for authentication informa-
tion to the home network. But, if a mobile virtual network
operator (MVNO) has (i) the same MCC and MNC as the
MNO from whom it purchases networking services in bulk;
and (ii) subscribers’ database in a completely different location
from that of MNO, then knowing only MCC and MNC is not
enough to identify the home network. In that case, an IPx
uses part of MSIN, in addition to MCC and MNC, for routing
visited network’s requests to the home network.
All in all, authentication information requests in 5G system
should include some cleartext routing information, in addition
to MCC and MNC. Please note that this extra information
may be used for tracking the user: for example, if information
equivalent of four MSIN digits is revealed, then the probability
of identifying a user becomes ten thousand times bigger. On
the other hand, solutions in which the MSIN is decrypted at
SN, e.g., IBE based solution do not have this weakness.
V. LAWFUL INTERCEPTION
According to 3GPP speciﬁcation [7], LI requirement is: the
SN should be able to identify a user with the IMSI without
relying on the HN. However, if the SN can not decrypt the
MSIN coming from the UE (because it may be encrypted by
the public key of the home network or be a pseudonym known
to HN only), then the SN has to learn the MSIN from the HN.
This is the case for both the root-key based or pseudonym
based solution.
In root-key and pseudonym based solutions, the SN has to
learn the IMSI from the HN. Apparently it means that the SN
is relying on the HN to resolve the IMSI of a user. However,
to be conﬁdent that the HN gave the original IMSI of a user,
several ways have been proposed in 3GPP SA3 [12], [13],
[14], [9], [10].
In [12], [13], the SN receives the SUCI and a hash
computed on the SUCI and SUPI from the UE. The SN also
receives the SUPI from the HN. So the SN can compute the
hash on SUCI and SUPI. If the HN gave a fake SUPI to the
SN then the hash computed by the SN would not match with
the hash the SN received from the UE.
In [14], the UE sends its SUPI to SN using the NAS
(Non-Access Stratum) security mode command procedure.
Since NAS security mode command procedure is usually
conﬁdentiality protected, SUPI privacy is also protected. The
SN does not provide service to UE, if SUPI indication from
UE and HN do not match.
In [9], the combination of NAS security mode command
procedure and the hash based technique is used. The hash
based technique is used when the NAS encryption is not active.
All these solutions add overhead due to new signalling mes-
sages or parameters in the messages of the authentication and
key agreement or of NAS security mode command. However,
the solution in [10] vouch for binding SUPI in generating the
anchor key in the VPLMN as mentioned in [15]. So, if the HN
gave a fake SUPI to the SN, the SN would generate a different
key than that of the UE. Thus, the UE will not be able to get
any service if the HN gives the SN a fake SUPI.
Nevertheless, the solutions in which MSIN can be de-
crypted in the SN do not have the concern of HN telling the
truth or lie. This is because the SN does not need the HN for
resolving the MSIN – the SN would learn the MSIN directly
from the UE. This is the case for certiﬁcate based and IBE
based solution. Unless the HN and the UE collude to fool the
LI entity in the SN, the LI entity can trust that the identity
given by the UE is correct after authentication of the UE has
succeeded.
VI. QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT
CATEGORIES OF SOLUTIONS
Qualitative comparison of different solutions based on
different criteria was presented in [23], [22]. In this paper
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we take the same approach. For smoother reading, we present
only those criteria which we have found to make a difference
between solutions. We only compare according to the solution
categories. We have discussed two different categories of
solutions: pseudonym based and public-key based. We have
categorized the different public-key technologies into three cat-
egories: certiﬁcate based, root-key based and identity based. In
Table I, we present a comparison among the different solutions
based on different criteria. We indicate the performance of
the solutions based on each criteria according the following
symbols : ++ very good, + good, +- somewhat okay, - not
good.
a) Immunity Against Active IMSI Catchers: This is
the most important criterion because the whole effort is to
defeat the active IMSI catchers. Before the concern around
IMSI-based routing surfaced, in pseudonym based and root-
key based solution, it was sufﬁcient to reveal MCC and
MNC to route the SUCI to the appropriate destination. So,
an active IMSI catcher could learn the MCC and MNC only.
However, because of the concerns around IMSI-based routing,
pseudonym based and root-key based solutions have to reveal
more information from MSIN. It makes them less immune
against active IMSI catchers. However, these solutions can still
achieve certain degree of anonymity. So, we evaluate them with
+-. Note that, in [23], these two solutions were evaluated with
+. The certiﬁcate based solution with global PKI can conceal
even MCC and MNC. So, we evaluate them with ++. In IBE
based solution, only MCC and MNC needs to be revealed. So
we evaluate it with +.
b) Lawful Interception: The LI requirement is that the
SN should be able to identify a user with the IMSI without
relying on the HN. Both in pseudonym based and root-key
based solutions, the SN has to rely on the HN to identify a
user with the IMSI – HN sends the IMSI to the SN. To be
conﬁdent that the HN gave the real IMSI some extra effort is
required as mentioned in [12], [13], [14], [9], [10]. Before the
concern around LI surfaced, this extra effort was not required.
Besides, in both of these solutions, it has to be assumed that the
HN and UE are not colluding. Only under such assumption,
the SN can trust that the IMSI given by the HN is correct.
Since it needs the assumption, we evaluate these two solutions
as +-. In certiﬁcate and IBE based solutions, the SUCI can be
decrypted in the SN. So, these two categories of solutions do
not have the concern of the HN telling the truth or lie. This
is because, the SN does not need the HN for resolving the
MSIN. The MSIN can be decrypted out of the SUCI by the
SN itself. So, we evaluate both of these solutions with +.
c) Deployment and Maintenance Effort: Pseudonym
based approach does not require standardization. Changes in
the SIM and HN – operated by the same entity, is sufﬁcient.
So, it is relatively easy to deploy. However, it makes the
subscription database very sensitive to any changes, hence
the maintenance becomes difﬁcult. So, we rate this with
+-. Certiﬁcate based solutions require setting up PKI and
maintaining it. That is a lot of effort. So we rate certiﬁcate
based solution with -. Root-key based and IBE based solutions
are fairly easy to deploy and maintain. So we rate them with
+.
d) Transparency to the Legacy SNs: To enable the
SN to identify a user with IMSI – the LI requirement,
the pseudonym based solutions require similar solutions as
mentioned in [12], [13], [14], [9], [10]. These solutions need
the SN to understand extra message ﬁelds sent by the HN. This
means the pseudonym based solutions are not transparent to
the legacy SNs. However, pseudonym based solution would be
transparent to the SNs if identifying a user using pseudonyms
would become a sufﬁcient LI requirement. So we evaluate
them with +-. Consequently, even though previously it was
a very important advantage of pseudonym based approach, it
becomes a just okay solution now in this regard. So we rate
this with +-. However, no other solutions are transparent to
SNs. Because in all the other solutions, the SN has to receive
ciphertext produced by public key – none of the legacy SNs
has to do that. So we rate all of them with -.
e) Signalling overhead: In pseudonym based solution,
the SN needs to know the IMSI of a user from the HN. To
be conﬁdent that the IMSI given by the HN is correct, similar
measures as mentioned in [12], [13], [14], [9], [10] have to be
implemented. This adds some extra signalling overhead on top
of what exists in the legacy networks. However, pseudonym
based solution does not use public key encryption. The use
of only symmetric key encryption produces shorter ciphertext
which keeps the signalling overhead signiﬁcantly low. So we
rate it with +. Certiﬁcate based solutions require an extra round
trip between the UE and the SN to exchange the certiﬁcate.
This creates signalling overhead. Certiﬁcate based solution
does not require the HN to give the IMSI to the SN. So,
certiﬁcate based solution does not require the added signalling
overhead as it requires in pseudonym based solution. This may
sound that pseudonym based and certiﬁcate based solutions
are equally good/bad in this criteria – both of them need
added signalling for different purposes. However, the added
signalling overhead in pseudonym based solution is in the core
network, whereas the added signalling overhead to exchange
the certiﬁcates is in the radio network. Besides certiﬁcates can
be quite long. So we rate certiﬁcate based solution with -. The
root-key based solution requires the similar extra signalling
as the pseudonym based solution requires. Besides it has to
route the SUCI all the way to the HN. The SUCI is generated
using public key encryption – quite longer than pseudonyms.
However, it does not need to exchange certiﬁcates – a signiﬁ-
cant relieve. So we rate it with +-. IBE based solutions do not
require any extra round trips or certiﬁcates – less signalling
overhead compared to certiﬁcate based solutions. IBE based
solution does not require the HN to give the IMSI to the SN.
For this reason, IBE based solution does not require the extra
signalling overhead as the pseudonym based or root-key based
solution require. However, IBE based solution produces SUCI
which are quite longer than pseudonyms. So we rate them with
+.
f) Computational overhead: Pseudonym based solu-
tions require some extra computation in the HN to generate
next pseudonym of a user randomly. However, this is quite
less complex in comparison with public key encryption. So,
we rate it with ++. Certiﬁcate based solutions require to
exchange and verify the certiﬁcate and compute public key
encryption/decryption. This creates computational overhead.
So, we rate it with -. However, both root-key and IBE based
solutions require public key encryption and decryption but do
not require verifying certiﬁcates. So we rate them with +.
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g) Latency: In pseudonym based solution, some extra
signalling overhead is needed to add to enable the SN to serve
the LI requirement. However, since pseudonym based solution
uses symmetric key encryption and does not use public key
encryption, the signalling and computational overhead is com-
paratively low. However, when the user is roaming, to resolve
the IMSI, the pseudonym has to travel all the way to the HN
– increases latency. So we rate it with -. Certiﬁcate based
solutions require an extra round trip between the UE and SN
to exchange and verify the certiﬁcates, computes public key
encryption and have longer message length. All these affect the
latency. So we rate certiﬁcate based solution too with -. In the
root-key based solution, when the user is roaming, to resolve
the IMSI, the pseudonym has to travel all the way to the HN
– increases latency. So we evaluate it with -. The IBE based
solutions do not require any extra round trips or certiﬁcates.
However, they compute public key encryption and have longer
message length. Hence the latency is affected. However, So we
rate them with +-.
h) Key revocation: Pseudonym based solution is a
symmetric-key based solution. So it does not require any key
revocation. So, we rate it with ++. However, all the public
key based solutions require a mechanism of key revocation. In
certiﬁcate based solution, to access the revocation list, a user
has to connect to an SN. How a UE may know that the public
key of the SN has already been revoked? On the other hand, in
IBE based solutions, revocation is inherently complicated. One
solution around this is to use short expiry time for the public
keys of the SNs. By doing so, key revocation increases some
overhead. So we rate both of them with -. In root key based
solution no revocation is required because there is only one
public key. If the corresponding private key is compromised,
the UE has to be re-provisioned with the new public key. So
we rate it with +.
i) Maturity: We also look at the solutions from the
point of view of the maturity of the technology. Use of
pseudonyms for privacy purpose is not yet a very matured
technology. Use of IBE is not yet widespread. So we rate
both of them with -. However, certiﬁcate based public-key
encryption technology is widespread and matured. Use of root-
key can be viewed as a special case of certiﬁcate based public-
key. So, we rate both of certiﬁcate based and root-key based
solutions with +.
j) Mutual authentication: It is possible that in future
there might be a need of mutual authentication between the UE
and the SN without the intervention of the HN. In this respect
we notice that pseudonym based and root-key based solution
can not be used for mutual authentication. This is because, in
these cases the IMSI is not visible to the SN without consulting
with the HN. So, we rate these two categories with -. However,
Certiﬁcate based and IBE based solutions can be extended into
a mutual authentication protocol between UE and SN. One
example can be found in [23]. So, we rate both of these two
categories with +.
k) Summary of the Comparison: Looking at the table,
it seems evident that IBE based solution is the most promising
solution. Certiﬁcate based approach is good in preventing
active IMSI catchers and handling the requirement of lawful in-
terception. But the solution is costly in almost all other aspects.
Maybe, the industry is not yet ready to spend such expenses to
provide user identity privacy. Even though pseudonym based
approach is inexpensive from almost all the aspects, it becomes
a bit less effective to achieve its original purpose - immunity
against active IMSI catchers. Because of the LI issues, it also
loses its most important merit - transparency with legacy SNs.
The root-key based approach is also a bit less effective in
serving its original purpose - immunity against active IMSI
catchers. It also makes the lawful interception a bit more
complicated than that of IBE based solution. However, key
revocation in IBE may have some latency whereas no key
revocation is required in root-key. But still, considering the
effectiveness of the solution, we would like to conclude that
IBE based solution is a better choice than the root-key based
solution.
VII. CONCLUSION
User identity privacy in 3GPP Release 15 – the ﬁrst release
of 5G system, will be based on what we call a ”root-key”
solution. It impacts IMSI-based routing of messages and the
legal interception (LI) entities in cellular networks. We have
analyzed these and other impacts for several solution types
for user identity privacy. It was found that IBE based solution
is in several ways better than the root-key based solution. In
conclusion, IBE based solution for user identity privacy could
be proposed for future 3GPP releases of 5G system.
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